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OF WHALING, JUDICIAL FIATS, TREATIES AND INDIANS: THE M AKAH
SAGA CONTINUES
Jeremy Stevens*
“Fiat lux et facta est lux.”1
“So is this great and wide sea,
wherein are things creeping innumerable,
both small and great beasts.
There go the ships:
there is that Leviathan
whom thou hast made to play therein.”2
“[O]ur treatment of Indians, even more than our treatment of
other minorities, reflects the rise and fall in our democratic faith.
Here, as in other parts of the world, the undermining of that faith
begins with the glorification of ‘expert administrators’ whose
power-drives are always accompanied by soft music about
‘the withering away of the state’ or the ultimate ‘liquidation’
of this or that bureau.”3
At the northwestern-most corner of the continental United States, on a 27,000
square acre reservation, reside the Makah.4 Currently the only group of the Nuu-chahnulth people within the realm of the United States of America,5 the Makah once exerted
dominion over a territory that consisted of all “that portion of the extreme northwest part
of Washington Territory . . . between Flattery Rocks on the Pacific coast, fifteen miles
south from Cape Flattery, and the Hoko [R]iver . . . eastward from the cape on the Strait
of [Juan de] Fuca.”6 The Makah also claimed Tatoosh Island, and indeed still today
retain Tatoosh Island and the cluster of land masses which the appellation has come to
*

J.D. Seattle University School of Law; B.S. Northwestern University. Special thanks to Bree Blackhorse
and Shay Story for the good – and hard – work they do; to Hank McGee for the broadness of his mind
and the bigness of his heart; and to Eric Eberhard for reminding us why we do the work we do and for
educating us all.
1
Genesis 1:3, Latin Vulgate (translated into common parlance: “‘Let there be light.’ And there was light.”).
2
Psalm 104: 25-6 (King James).
3
Felix S. Cohen, The Erosion of Indian Rights, 1950–1953: A Case Study in Bureaucracy, 62 YALE L.J.
348, 390 (1953).
4
William Bradford, Save the Whales” v. Save the Makah: Finding Negotiated Solutions to
Ethnodevelopmental Disputes in the New International Economic Order, 13 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 155, 172
(Fall 2000).
5
Other Nuu-chah-nulth tribal people live on Vancouver Island and along the central critic Columbia coast.
See Ruth Kirk, TRADITION AND CHANGE ON THE NORTHWEST COAST: THE MAKAH, NUU-CHAH-NULTH,
SOUTHERN KWAKIUTL, AND NUXALK 8-9, University of Washington Press (1986).
6
JAMES G. SWAN, THE INDIANS OF CAPE FLATTERY, AT THE ENTRANCE TO THE STRAIT OF FUCA, W ASHINGTON
TERRITORY, in 220 The Smithsonian Contributions to Knowledge 1, 4 (1868) available at
http://www.sos.wa.gov/history/publications_detail.aspx?p=74 (last visited Oct. 31, 2012).
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represent.7 But the whole of the Makah ancestral lands “is of a mountainous character,
and is the termination of the Olympic range, [covered with] an almost impenetrable
forest.”8 The inhospitable climate–the winds, the rains, the rocky crags, the clay dirt and
sandstone, and the occasional boulder of granite–is not suitable for cultivation. Owing to
the terrain and the climate, the Makah engaged in very limited amounts of agriculture,
cultivating potatoes “at a hill on Flattery rocks” 9 and picking berries, naturally resident to
the terrain. It is thus not difficult to understand that the Makah were primarily “a
seafaring people who spent their lives either on the water or close to the shore;” 10
sprinkled with the occasional tuber, nut, berry or sea fowl, most of the Makah
“subsistence came from the sea where they fished for salmon, halibut and other fish,
and hunted for whale and seal.”11 But paramount to the Makah of all the fecund ocean’s
largesse was the California Gray Whale.12 As the Makah themselves assert, whale
hunting is the “symbolic heart” of their culture.13
And the Makah have been hunting whales for 1,500 years.14 Makah religion in
fact instructs that Thunderbird, a “flying wolflike god, delivered a whale to their shores to
save them from starvation.”15 For at least 3,000 years since, the “gray whales have
been sacred icons in the petroglyphs, jewelry, art, carvings, songs, and dances”16 of the
Makah. Whaling has not only been a source of subsistence to the Makah as they have
learned to survive–thrive, even, before westward expansion squeezed them onto their
current reservation–atop their clump of clay, rock, and dirt–whaling has been “an
expression of religious faith and community cohesion.”17 Nowhere else is this

7

Id.
Id. at 2.
9
Id.
10
United States v. State of Wash., 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974).
11
Id.
12
“The California gray is the kind usually taken by the Indians, the others being but rarely attacked.”
SWAN, supra note 6, at 19.
13
Makah Tribal Council, Application for a Waiver of the MMPA Take Moratorium to Exercise Gray Whale
Hunting Rights Secured in the Treaty of Neah Bay, submitted to NOAA (Feb. 11, 2005) at 8.
14
See generally, SWAN, supra note 6, at 4.
15
Bradford, supra note 4, at 171.
16
Id. at 172.
17
Id. “The practice of the whalers is particularly revealing of the religious essence of Makah whaling: in
order to become spiritually pure enough to enter the spirit world whey they could become ‘at one with the
whale’ and deserving of the whale’s gift of itself to them, Makah whalers were required to undergo
grueling physical training which included abstention from sex, self-infliction of floggings with stinging
nettled, bathing in frigid ponds, lying naked on the beach covered in sand fleas, and swimming large
rocks from one river bank to another.” Footnote 52. But the Makah were also ‘emphatic’ traders of whale
blubber and oil to white traders, lumber mills and other tribes along the coast of the Pacific Northwest.
Indeed, the trading of whale oil brought a notable degree of prosperity to the tribe. See SWAN, supra note
6, at 31-2. And modern scholars posit that as much as 84.6 % of the Makah pre-contact diet could have
been composed of whale meat and other whale derivatives. See Ann M. Renker, Ph.D, Whale Hunting
and the Makah Tribe: A Needs Statement, April 2007,
http://iwcoffice.org/cache/downloads/ds5fzaq2p14w88ocko00o4gcw/64-ASW%204.pdf (last visited Oct.
31, 2012).
8
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reverence, this sense of cultural inter-dependence, more illustrated than in the Treaty of
Neah Bay.18
The Treaty of Neah Bay is the constitutionally binding source of federal plenary
authority and dominion over the Makah Indians–the exercise of the Indian Commerce
clause which grants the congressional right to dictate by legislative fiat the totality of
Makah affairs. Effectuated in 1855, it is but one of the “eleven different treaties, each
with several different tribes”19 produced by Governor Isaac Stevens.20
Congress’ chosen method of opening up vast swaths of Pacific Northwest land
for white westward expansion was through the negotiation of treaties, as an instrument
of conquest.21 And to clear the way for white settlement onto Indian lands, to
accommodate the increasing flow of American settlers pouring into the lowlands of
Puget Sound and the river valleys north of the Columbia River, Governor Isaac Stevens
was tasked with inducing the Indians of the area to move “voluntarily” 22 onto
reservations. Indeed, Governor Stevens was well-suited for the undertaking. He
recognized in the Makah not much concern for their land (save for their village, burial
sites, and other sundry locations), but recognized great concern for “their marine
hunting and fishing rights.”23 The Governor therefore reassured the Makah that the
United States government did not “intend to stop them from marine hunting and fishing
but in fact would help them to develop these pursuits.” 24 But Governor Stevens did not
speak the Makah’s language, nor did the Makah representatives speak English.
Instead, the Treaty of Neah Bay was negotiated in English and an interpreter translated
English into “Chinook Jargon” which then a member of the Clallum Tribe translated into
Makah: English into Chinook into Makah, and back.25 Nevertheless, Governor Stevens
was sufficiently intuitive and well enough informed to recognize the primacy of the whale
18

Treaty of Neah Bay, Jan. 31, 1855, U.S.-Makah Tribe, 12 Stat. 939. Neah Bay is situated on the
Northwestern corner of the Olympic Peninsula in Clallam County, Washington.
19
United States v. State of Wash., 384 F. Supp. At 330. .
20
Governor (US Army Colonel) Isaac Stevens was neither a benevolent nor a pusillanimous man. Born in
Massachusetts in 1818 and a top of his class West Point graduate, having been a strong supporter of
Franklin Pierce’s presidential candidacy, he was rewarded for his dedication with the position of
Governor/Superintendent of Indian Affairs for the newly created Washington Territory. In this capacity and
with the occasional use of intimidation and force, Governor Stevens orchestrated virtually all of the of the
US-Indian treaties – Treaty of Medicine Creek, Treaty of Hellgate, Treaty of Neah Bay, Treaty of Point
Elliott, Point No Point Treaty, Quinault Treaty – which laid the foundation of Indian displacement, loss of
cultural identity, and Indian Tribal rights and reservation boundaries in the Pacific Northwest. Despite his
hostility toward Natives (or perhaps as a consequence of it), Governor Stevens was popular enough to be
elected delegate to the United States Congress in 1857 and 1858. But he resumed service in the United
States Army when the civil war began in 1861, became a brigadier general on September 28, 1861, and
was shot in the head while leading an infantry charge at the Battle of Chantilly, going on to meet his
maker instantly on September 1, 1882.
21
United States v. State of Wash., 384 F. Supp. at 330 .
22
See United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d at 682-83 (9th Cir. Wash. 1975) (aff’g United States v.
Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974).
23
Id.
24
United States v. State of Wash., 384 F. Supp. at 330.
25
Robert J. Miller, Speaking with Forked Tongues: Indian Treaties, Salmon, and the Endangered Species
Act, 70 OR. L. REV. 543, 553 (1991).
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in Makah culture; indeed, the man “promised United States assistance in securing a
treaty-based right for the Makah to whale and promot[e] Makah whaling” 26 because, in
his own words, "[t]he Great Father knows what whalers you are.” 27 Much of the official
record of the treaty negotiations thus deals with securing the right to whale; and as
consideration for that treaty-reserved right, the Makah ceded 91% of their land–a full
300,000 square acres–and retained only a 27,000 square acre wind-swept, crag-ridden,
“mountainous, forest-covered region, with no arable land except the low swamp and
marsh.”28 The Makah were not interested in becoming tillers of soil or hunters of the elk,
deer and bear which dwelt among them. Yes, the Makah grew their potatoes and
gathered berries when the season was proper, but no culture can survive on tubers and
berries alone; a people requires “animal food, and [the Makah] prefer[red] the products
of the ocean to the farina of the land.”29 As a testament to the importance of the whale
to every aspect of Makah culture and as an illustration of the extent to which the act of
whaling was more important to the Makah than it was to any other tribe with which the
Government negotiated a treaty, the Treaty of Neah Bay is the only United StatesIndian treaty which secures for the Indians the express right to whale: the “right of taking
fish and of whaling or sealing at usual and accustomed grounds and stations is further
secured to said Indians in common 30 with all citizens of the United States.”31
But in Anderson v. Evans,32 the Ninth Circuit abrogated that right, and did so
through applying an eminently improper analytical framework of its own making. 33 Part I
of this article will chart the unhappy sequence of events leading up to the Anderson
decision as the Makah sought–and continue to seek today–to re-establish their longcustomary and treaty-reserved practice of whaling. Next, this article will consider the
canons of United States-Indian treaty interpretation relevant to the Anderson court’s
failings. Included in this proposition is identifying the source of federal power over
Indians, identifying the source of state power over Indians, and identifying what are
referred to as the state conservation necessity test and the federal weight and
consideration test. As each appellation suggests, the former is used to assess the
effects a state’s regulation imposes upon an Indian treaty-reserved right while the latter
26

Bradford, supra note 4, at 172 (citing Keith Johnson, The Makah Manifesto, SEATTLE TIMES, August 23,
1998, at B9, http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=19980823&slug=2768010 (last
visited Oct. 31, 2012)).
27
Id.
28
SWAN, supra note 6, at 2.
29
Id.
30
But “[t]here is no indication that the Indians intended or understood the language ‘in common with all
citizens of the Territory’ to limit their right to fish in any way. For many years following the treaties the
Indians continued to fish in their customary manner and places . . .” United States v. State of Wash., 384
F. Supp. at 333.
31
Treaty of Neah Bay, ART. 4, Jan. 31, 1855, U.S.-Makah Tribe, 12 Stat. 939.
32
371 F.3d 475, 501 (9th Cir. 2004) (amending 314 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 2002)).
33
A string of articles addresses the Ninth Circuit’s analytical errors, see Zachary Tomlinson, Abrogation or
Regulation? How Anderson v. Evans Discards the Makah’s Treaty Whaling Right in the Name of
Conservation Necessity, 78 W ASH. L. REV. 1101 (2003); Emily Brand, The Struggle to Exercise a Treaty
Right: An Analysis of the Makah Tribe’s Path to Whale, 32 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL'Y J. 287, 305 (2009);
Bradford, supra note 4, at 172, and one outlier among them even defends the Ninth Circuits analytical
errors. See Karol Koppelman, Anderson v. Evans: the Ninth Circuit Harmonizes Treaty Rights and the
Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. ENV. L. & POL’Y 287, 353 (2010).
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is used to assess the effects a federal regulation imposes upon an Indian treatyreserved right. This article will then address in Part III why the Anderson decision was
incorrectly decided and in conclusion, this article will present the current state of the
Makah’s efforts to resume their treaty-reserved right of “whaling or sealing at usual and
accustomed grounds and stations”34 in exercise of their treaty right to do so.
I. THE MAKAH’S QUEST TO RE-ESTABLISH WHALING
Having been whalers for over 1,500 years,35 in the 1920s, as greatly “improved
equipment increased the slaughter of [whales] to such a degree that world-wide
attention began to focus on the possibility of hunting several species of whales to
extinction,” the Makah voluntarily ceased their whaling activities.36 Recognizing the
pressing need to roll back the near extirpation of several whale species, in 1937 several
nations–among them the United States of America–signed the first International
Whaling Agreement.37 Faced with the virtual extinction of the California Gray Whale
nine years later in 1946, the United States signed the International Convention for the
Regulation of Whaling (ICRW), established in order “to provide for the proper
conservation of whale stocks and thus make possible the orderly development of the
whaling industry.”38 The ICRW then enacted a “schedule of whaling regulations”39 and
created the International Whaling Commission (IWC) as its rule-making/enforcement
arm. The IWC was to be “composed of one member from each signatory nation,” and
the ICRW granted the IWC the power to amend the “schedule of whaling regulations” by
“adopting regulations with respect to the conservation and utilization of whale
resources;”40 this included–and remains to this day–setting quotas for the maximum
number of whales that can lawfully be taken in any one whaling season. IWC then
placed an outright ban on taking or killing gray whales,41 but allowed an aboriginal
subsistence exception “when the meat and products of such are to be used exclusively
for local consumption by the aborigines.”42 Congress for its part passed the Whaling
Convention Act in 1949 “to implement domestically the International Convention for the
34

Treaty of Neah Bay, ART. 4, Jan. 31, 1855, U.S.-Makah Tribe, 12 Stat. 939.
When Attila the Hun was ravaging the eastern boundaries of the Roman Empire, the Makah where
whaling. Prior to contact with non-Indians in fact, the Makahs had been hunting “whale successfully for at
least 1200 years without destroying the resources. Ceremonial, social and cultural proscriptions
established a functional balance between the Makahs and the whale populations which swam in or
through Makah waters.” Renker, supra note 17, at 12. See also SWAN, supra note 6.
36
Murray Lundberg, Thar She Blows! Whaling in Alaska and the Yukon, Explore North, available at
http://explorenorth.com/library/yafeatures/bl-whaling.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2012). See also Anderson
v. Evans, 371 F.3d 475, 480 (9th Cir. 2004).
37
For an accessible and readable snapshot overview of the Makah’s discouraging quest up to 2008, see
NOAA, Chronology of Major Events Related to Makah Tribal Whale Hunt, 2008, available at
http://www.nwr.noaa.gov/Marine-Mammals/Whales-Dolphins-Porpoise/Gray-Whales/Makah-chron.cfm
(last visited Oct. 31, 2012).
38
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, 62 Stat. 1716, 1717 (1946).
39
Metcalf v. Daley, 214 F.3d 1135, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000).
40
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, 62 Stat. 1716, 1718-19 (1946).
41
See 62 Stat. 1716, 1723, 161 U.N.T.S. 72 (Dec. 2, 1946).
42
62 Stat. at 1723. Note that this qualification the Metcalf court and others refer to as the “aboriginal
subsistence exception.” See Metcalf v. Daley, 241 F.3d at 1138.
35
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Regulation of Whaling.”43 The Whaling Convention Act prohibits whaling in violation of
ICRW, the IWC schedule of whaling regulations, or any whaling regulation adopted by
the United States Secretary of Commerce.44 Furthermore, and most relevant for the
purpose of this article, Congress has tasked the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) and the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) with the
promulgation of regulations to implement the Whaling Convention Act.45
Notwithstanding IWC, NOAA and NMFS efforts, unhappily, by 1970 the global
gray whale population–that awesome but “gentle giant of the sea”46–had decreased to
less than a meager 2,000 individual leviathans. The next significant development vis-àvis the Makah, then, came that very year when Congress designated the California
Gray Whale as an endangered species in compliance with the United States
Endangered Species Conservation Act (ESA); 47 two years later, in 1972, Congress
enacted the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA). Under the MMPA, the NOAA is
responsible for the conservation of, among others, the California Gray Whale, that
behemoth long instrumental to Makah cultural identity and preservation.
Happily, by June of 1994, the Eastern North Pacific (ENP) population of the
California Gray Whale had “recovered to near its estimated original population size and
[was] neither in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range,
nor likely to again become endangered within the foreseeable future throughout all or a
significant portion of its range.”48 This steady, stable population of approximately 20,000
California Gray Whales49 leisurely roaming the seas was delisted under the ESA that
same year, and the Makah decided to resume its hunting of those “who migrated
through the Sanctuary.”50 To accomplish this end, the Makah sought the assistance of
the Federal government’s Department of Commerce: specifically, the NOAA which
Congress had tasked with the promulgation of regulations to implement the Whaling
Convention Act. Indeed, on March 22, 1996, the Makah and the NOAA entered into a
43

Id. See also 16 U.S.C.A. § 916 et seq. (1985).
See Metcalf v. Daley, 241 F.3d at 1138. See also 16 U.S.C.A. § 916c (1985).
45
See 16 U.S.C. § 916 et seq; 50 C.F.R. § 230.1 (1998).
46
Mary Jordan, Gentle Giants of the Sea Return to Mexico Lagoon, THE W ASHINGTON POST, Feb. 20,
2005, at A01, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A38433-2005Feb19?language=printer (last
visited Oct. 31, 2012).
47
The Endangered Species Conservation Act was the precursor to the 1973 Endangered Species Act
48
Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Final Rule to Remove the Eastern North Pacific
Population of the Gray Whale From the List of Endangered Wildlife, 59 Fed. Reg. 31,094 (June 16, 1994)
(codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
49
See Jordan, Supra at A01.
50
Metcalf v. Daley, 214 F. 3d at 1138. Makah whaling has long targeted the California gray whale, which
migrates between the North Pacific and the coast of Mexico. “During their yearly journey, the migratory
whale population travels through the Olympic Coast National Marine Sanctuary (“Sanctuary”), which
Congress established in 1993 in order to protect the marine environment in a pristine ocean and coastal
area. A small sub-population of gray whales, commonly referred to as ‘summer residents,’ live in the
Sanctuary throughout the entire year.” Id. For further profitable information about the California gray
whale and its usefulness to the Makah, See Ann M. Render, Ph.D., Whale Hunting and the Makah Tribe:
A Needs Statement, 5- 23 (April 2007),
http://iwcoffice.org/cache/downloads/ds5fzaq2p14w88ocko00o4gcw/64-ASW%204.pdf (last visited Oct.
31, 2012).
44
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formal written agreement by which the “NOAA, through the United States Commissioner
to the IWC, will make a formal proposal to the IWC for a quota of gray whales for
subsistence and ceremonial use by the Makah Tribe.” 51 But in response to this
agreement, in June of 1997, two organizations–Australians for Animals and the BEACH
Marine Protection–submitted a letter to NOAA “alleging that the United States
Government had violated National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) by authorizing and
promoting the Makah whaling proposal without preparing an” 52 Environmental
Assessment (EA) or an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). The NOAA responded
by distributing an EA for public comment, in compliance with the National Environmental
Policy Act, on August 22, 1997.53 A short time later, on October 13, 1997, NOAA and
the Makah entered into a new written agreement which “required the Makah to confine
hunting activities to the open waters of the Pacific Ocean.” 54 After the signing of this
new agreement, the NOAA issued a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) four days
later, on October 17, 1997.55
One day later at the IWC’s annual meeting the United States on behalf of the
Makah, and the Russian Confederation on behalf of a Siberian aboriginal group called
the Chukotka, submitted a “joint proposal for a five-year block quota of 620 whales. The
total quota of 620 assumed an average annual harvest of 120 whales by the Chukotka
and an average annual harvest of four whales by the Makah.”56 Yet some delegates
“expressed doubts about whether the Makah qualified for the quota under the
‘aboriginal subsistence’ exception,”57 and therefore suggested “amending the joint
proposal to allow the quota to be used only by aboriginal groups whose traditional
subsistence and cultural needs have been recognized by the International Whaling
Commission.”58 The United States rejected this amendment, arguing that the IWC had
no “established mechanism for recognizing such needs.” 59 The proposal submitted by
the United States and the Russian Federation was thus amended to allow the block
quota of 620 whales to be used only by aboriginal groups “whose traditional subsistence
and cultural needs have been recognized.”60 This quota shortly thereafter was
approved, and on April 6, 1998, NOAA issued a Federal Register Notice allocating a
51

Metcalf v. Daley214 F. 3d at 1139.
Id. Under the National Environmental Policy Act, when a Federal agency develops a proposal to take
an action, there are three levels of analysis that a federal agency must undertake to comply with the law.
These three levels include: preparation of a Categorical Exclusion (CE); and if no CE applies, the
preparation of an Environmental Assessment (EA) and Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI); or when
there has been no FONSI, the preparation and drafting of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).
53
Metcalf v. Daley, 214 F. 3d at 1139.
54
Id. (interior quotations omitted). The Metcalf court further provided, “Apparently, this provision was
added to the Agreement in order to increase the probability that, although the whaling would occur in the
Sanctuary, the Makah would hunt only migratory whales, rather than the Sanctuary’s ‘summer residents.’”
55
Id.
56
Metcalf v. Daley, 214 F. 3d at 1140 (emphasis added).
57
Id.
58
Id. (interior quotations omitted.) The Metcalf court presumes that these delegates, for their own
reasons, “were attempting to amend the proposal in a manner that would allow the Chukotka to harvest
gray whales, but would prohibit the Makah from doing so.” Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
52

105

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW JOURNAL

Volume I, Issue I – Fall 2012

quota to the Makah for limited hunts in 1999. This allowed the Makah, in lawful exercise
of its re-established expressly-reserved treaty right, to engage in whaling “pursuant to
the IWC-approved quota and Whaling Convention Act regulations.”61
Meanwhile, on the very day the 1997 Finding of No Significant Impact was
released by the NOAA–October 17, 1997–Congressman Jack Metcalf,62 joined by
Australians for Animals, BEACH Marine Protection and others, filed a complaint in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia alleging that the federal
defendants–NOAA and NMFS–violated the National Environmental Policy Act, the
Whaling Convention Act and the Administrative Procedures Act.63 Metcalf et al. chiefly
contended that NOAA’s Environmental Assessment was a “deficient effort” 64 organized
simply to “justify the prior agreement allowing the Tribe to hunt whales.”65 After granting
the Makah’s motion to intervene, the District Court transferred the case to the Western
District of Washington.66 The district court for the Western District of Washington
granted summary judgment for the Makah and their Federal allies.67 Thereafter, the
Makah, having voluntarily suspended whaling operations in the 1920s, resumed whaling
under full federal supervision in 1999. On May 17, 1999, the Makah
celebrated a pivotal moment in [their] long history. At 6:54 a.m., the
Creator allowed a Makah crew to realize a collective dream that the
Makah Nation had stored in its minds and hearts for seventy long years:
they brought a whale home to the Tribe. This pivotal cultural event riveted
the attention of the Makah community, and energized Makah Tribal
members who believed in, and worked toward, the restoration of this
significant cultural and subsistence practice.68
1,200 Makah watched the hunt’s successful completion on live television; hundreds of
off-reservation Makah traveled home to the land of their fathers, seeking only to be a
part of this event; 1,400 Makahs gathered at Front Beach in Neah Bay to welcome the
whale and the successful whalers; and as they undertook the process of preparing the
food and resources for consumption and sharing at a later date, many “ate raw blubber
right on the spot.”69

61

Id. See also Notice of Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling Quotas, 63 Fed. Reg. 16,701 (April 6, 1998)
(codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 230).
62
Congressman Jack Metcalf, 1997 – 2007, was elected as a Republican to the One Hundred Fourth,
Fifth and Sixth Congresses (January 3, 1995-January 3, 2001) but was not a candidate for reelection to
the One Hundred Seventh Congress. See Biographical Directory of the United States Congress available
at http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=M000669 (last visited Oct. 31, 2012)
Congressman Metcalf died of Alzheimer’s at an Alzheimer’s care facility in Oak Harbor, WA, on March
15th, 2007.
63
See Metcalf v. Daley, 214 F.3d at 1140. See also Anderson v. Evans, 371 F.3d at 485.
64
Anderson v. Evans, 371 F.3d at 485.
65
Id.
66
See Metcalf v. Daley,, 214 F.3d at 1140. See also Anderson v. Evans, 371 F.3d at 485.
67
Id.
68
Renker, supra note 17, at 15.
69
Id.
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But neither the whale’s demise nor the Tribe’s jubilation brought “this prolonged
dispute to an end,”70 for the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reversed the district court in Metcalf v. Daley71, concluding that
NOAA violated NEPA because agencies must engage the NEPA process
before any irreversible and irretrievable commitment of resources.
Therefore, before NOAA can issue the Tribe a permit or waiver under the
MMPA, which would be an irretrievable commitment of resources, NOAA
must complete the NEPA process. Otherwise, NOAA may have granted
permits for takings of marine mammals without first fully considering the
effects of that federal action through NEPA.72
The Metcalf court accordingly ordered that a new EA must be drafted “under
circumstances that ensure an objective evaluation free of the previous taint.” 73 In
compliance with the court’s directive, NOAA then rescinded its agreement with the
Makah and began the EA process anew.74 Unfortunately their next effort would prove no
more successful, but would be far more discouraging than its predecessor had.
II. CANNONS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN TREATY INTERPRETATION UNITED STATES
The Federal government was granted its power to govern when by act of
ratification in 1790 the Constitution was finally approved by each of the original thirteen
colonies.75 Because each of the thirteen colonies granted the Federal government only
those powers explicitly stated in the Constitution and reserved unto themselves a great
multitude of powers, the states derive their authority over Indian affairs from a different
paradigm than whence originate the Federal government’s powers over Indian tribes.\
A. Source of Federal Power Over Indian Tribes
The source of federal authority over Indian tribes derives from the United States
Constitution, through the Treaty Clause and the Indian Commerce Clause. 76 Nearly two
hundred years ago, in fact, the Supreme Court stated that the “Constitution . . . confers
on congress the powers of war and peace; of making treaties, and of regulating
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian
tribes. These powers comprehend all that is required for the regulation of our
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Metcalf v. Daley,, 214 F. 3d at 43.
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Anderson v. Evans, 371 F.3d at 501 (citing Metcalf, 214 F.3d at 1143) (interior quotations omitted).
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Metcalf v. Daley,, 214 F.3d at 1146.
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The historian will of course recognize that the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
decided that only nine states would be required to ratify the Constitution; yet in 1790, on May 29, Rhode
Island, the last of the thirteen original colonies to do so, ratified for its part the United States Constitution,
thus categorically imbuing that document by unanimous act of “The People” with what force it possesses
and the Federal Government with the powers its founding document enumerates.
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U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl 3.
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intercourse with Indians.”77 Supreme Court decisions involving Indian affairs have
therefore referenced jus gentium–the law of nations–to explain and justify the
relationship between the Federal government and Indian tribes.78 Consequently, the
field of Indian law has its roots in international law. 79 And just as the Treaty Clause
grants the President power to enter into binding agreements with extra-territorial nations
subject to ratification by the Senate, the Treaty clause also grants the President power
to enter into binding agreements with Indian tribes subject to Senate approval, and “has
been a principal foundation for federal power over Indian affairs.” 80
Consider then that Indian tribes once were vast, indomitable governmental forces
exerting their dominion over miles and miles of inhospitable and rugged terrain even as
throngs of young Americans and recent immigrants rushed westward to hack a life out
of the wilderness the Indians regarded as their own. Consider this and it is easy to
ascertain just how the Supreme Court could state that treaties with these Indian tribes
were not grants of property or sovereignty from the United States to Indian tribes, but
conversely, treaties with these Indian tribes were acts of cession, acts of surrendering
those long-held property rights–the dominion and governance over millions of acres of
tribal hunting, grazing and wintering grounds–by the Indians to the United States,
subject to a reservation of rights not explicitly relinquished.81
The United States Supreme Court first attempted to formulate its views of Indian
tribes and their legal and historical relation to the land in Johnson v. McIntosh.82 In
Johnson the Court held that the discovery of lands in the new world gave the
discovering Europeans a sovereign title, good against all other Europeans and the “sole
right of acquiring the soil from the natives.”83 Thus, Indians only retained the right of
occupancy which only the sovereign could extinguish, either by “purchase or by
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Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 559 (1832) (first emphasis added, second emphasis in original).
See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 53 (1831); Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543, 71-84
(1823) (regarding rights of ‘discovering nations’).
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See FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 5.01 (2005 ed.).
80
Id.
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See United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905). See also FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 2.02 (2005 ed.).
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Johnson v. Mcintosh, 21 U.S. at 543. But 13 years earlier in 1810 the Court hinted that Indians did not
hold title to their lands sufficient to validate a transfer for those lands to non-natives in Fletcher v. Peck,
10 U.S. 87 (1810) (stating that the “reservation for the use of the Indians appears to be a temporary
arrangement suspending, for a time, the settlement of the country reserved, and the powers of the royal
governor within the territory reserved, but is not conceived to amount to an alteration of the boundaries of
the colony.” Id. at 142). In 1795, members of the Georgia legislature had been bribed to convey 35 million
acres of land to private companies at a price of 1.5 cents an acre. In 1796, the Georgia legislature
rescinded the grant of land, but by then much of the property already had been conveyed to unsuspecting
investors. In an opinion authored by Chief Justice Marshall the Court held that it was unconstitutional for
Georgia to rescind its grant of land. The Court indicated that the legislative power is limited by both “the
general principles of our political institutions,” 10 U.S. at 139, and “the words of the Constitution.” Id.
Because title had been conveyed to innocent owners, the law rescinding the grant was deemed to
unconstitutionally interfere with vested rights. Because the Indians lacked any proper claim to the land,
their conveyance of the land was invalid.
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Johnson v. Mcintosh, 21 U.S at 573.
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conquest.”84 The “sovereign” in this case was not a king but the United States
government. The result of Johnson v. McIntosh, then, was that the Federal government
was to recognize a legal right of Indians in their lands, good against all third parties but
existing at the mere sufferance of the federal government: this right to occupancy is
referred to as “aboriginal title” or simply “Indian title.” Additionally, the proposition that
the Federal government possesses plenary authority over Indian tribes by virtue of
having discovered them is referred to as the Doctrine of Discovery.
Eight years later, the Supreme Court further defined the Federal relationship to
Indian tribes in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia 85 when it held that Indian tribes are
domestic dependent nations: Indians were acknowledged to possess an unquestionable
right to the lands they occupy, “yet it may well be doubted whether those tribes which
reside within the acknowledged boundaries of the United States can, with strict
accuracy, be denominated foreign nations. They may more correctly . . . be
denominated domestic dependent nations.”86 Therefore, Indian tribes are not foreign
states or states within the meaning of Article III of the Constitution. Instead, an Indian
tribe is to be regarded as a dependent nation, with “a distinct political society separated
from others, capable of managing its own affairs and governing itself.” 87 Indeed, Chief
Justice Marshall’s characterization of Indian tribes as “domestic dependent nations” laid
the groundwork for future protection of tribal sovereignty by Marshall and his immediate
successors. But the characterization also created an opportunity for much later Courts
to discover limits to tribal sovereignty inherent in the domestic dependent status of
tribes.
Yet before later Courts would discover limits to Indian tribal sovereignty, the
Marshall Court further circumscribed the nature of Indian tribal sovereignty: State
governments could be excluded from exerting dominion over Indian affairs due to the
actual words of the United States Constitution,88 the Articles of Confederation, and in
Worcester v. Georgia.89 In Worcester, Chief Justice Marshall developed the idea that
Indian tribes are nations whose independence had been limited in only two essentials–
their right to convey land and their ability to deal with foreign powers. Reinforcing the
tribal right of self-government and the exclusive federal right to govern relations
between the tribe and outsiders, the Supreme Court ruled that Georgia laws which
sought to influence on-reservation behavior were nullities because they conflicted with
federal dominion over Indian affairs. Indeed, state laws seeking to influence onreservation behavior are “repugnant”90 to the Constitution–and this not due to the
essential character or nature of Indian tribes, but due to the primacy and plenary
authority of Congress to dictate by legislative fiat the sum of tribal affairs. The trilogy of
Justice Marshall’s opinions thus stands for the propositions relevant to this article that
(1) state law by virtue of its essential character does not apply within treaty-reserved
84

Id. at 587.
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. at 1.
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Id. at 17.
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Id. at 30.
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Indian land; (2) tribes are distinct political entities; (3) a trust doctrine exists whereby the
Federal government is charged with protecting tribal sovereignty from state incursion;
and (4) it is the Federal government’s power, by virtue of Congress, that serves to block
the application of state laws, not the tribe’s status as a distinct political subdivision.
Yet attendant to the power to enter into a treaty is the power to abrogate that
selfsame treaty, and the Supreme Court has applied this axiom to treaties with Indian
tribes.91 Indeed, because Indian tribes are “domestic dependent nations,” 92 their
“incorporation within the territory of the United States, and their acceptance of its
protection, necessarily divested them of some aspects of the sovereignty which they
had previously exercised.”93 Because the tribes have surrendered rights to the Federal
government, Congress’ constitutionally-granted power over Indian affairs is “plenary and
exclusive.”94
By virtue of categorical ratification, then, “the People” have imbued the
Constitution with legal effect, thus granting the Federal government authority to enter
into binding treaties with foreign nations. Expressly, the Constitution elevates those
treaties to the perch of the “supreme Law of the land.” And by virtue of the Marshall
Court’s decisions declaring them so, and due to their inability to mount any realistic
sense of militaristic resistance, Indian tribes in effect are “domestic dependent nations,”
owing their existence to and depending upon the largesse and protection of the Federal
government. Consequently, the Federal government has the power to expand or
contract or abrogate any treaty stipulation Congress so desires. This is so because the
Constitution and Supreme Court precedents say it is so, and because Indian tribes have
no armies.
B. Source of State Power Over Indian Tribes
Whereas the Federal government’s power to regulate Indian tribes and their
treaty rights extends from the Federal government’s constitutionally-enumerated
authority to regulate “Commerce with . . . the Indian tribes” 95 and from Congress’
plenary power over treaties,”96 a state by “virtue of its police power has the initial
authority to regulate the taking of fish and game.” 97 Indeed, the Supreme Court has
stated that it “see[s] no reason why the rights of the Indians may not also be regulated
by an appropriate exercise of the police power of the State.”98 As a direct product of a
91

See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903); see also United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986).
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. at 1.
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U.S. v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 328 (1978).
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Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of Yakima Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1979).
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U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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state’s police power, a state’s regulatory authority thus does not extend–unless
congressionally-mandated–to federal lands, such as to federal lands held in trust for
Indian tribes,99 or to United States waters. Since the Federal government possesses
plenary power to enter into Indian treaties and to abrogate rights expressly retained by
treaties, and since the state derives its powers over Indian tribes either through nonconstitutionally enumerated power to police or through an explicit act of Congress, 100 it
is easy to understand the appropriateness of two different analytical frameworks
through which to assess a regulation’s effect on rights explicitly protected by United
States-Indian treaties. These two frameworks are referred to as the State conservation
necessity test, and the federal weight and consideration test.
C. Canons of Treaty Interpretation
Interpretation of United States-Indian treaties begins and ends with the Supreme
Court’s maxim: “the intention to abrogate or modify a treaty is not to be lightly imputed
to Congress.”101 In consideration of the cultural differences between Indian tribes, the
United States government and its representatives, then, and out of deference to the
federal role as trustee of lands and resources for Indian tribes, the Supreme Court has
fashioned rules of treaty construction sympathetic to Indians.102 First, United StatesIndian treaty provisions are to be liberally construed in favor of the Indians in order to
accomplish the protective purpose under which the Federal government entered into the
treaties with the Indian tribes.103 And although United States-Indian treaty negotiations
were between the Federal government and the Indian tribe, the treaties nonetheless
“reserved rights . . . to every individual Indian, as though named therein . . . and the
right was intended to be continuing against the United States and its grantees as well as
against the state and its grantees.”104 Finally, treaties were “not a grant of rights to the
Indians, but a grant of rights from them–a reservation of those not granted.”105 The
extent of that grant will be construed as understood by the Indians at that time, taking
99

See Bryan v. Itasca County, Minnesota, 426 U.S. 373 (1976) (holding that a state does not have
regulatory authority over Indian activity on tribal land absent specific Congressional authority).
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An example of an explicit act of Congress granting states power over Indians within Indian country is
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Pigeon River Improvement, Slide & Boom Co. v. Charles W. Cox, Ltd., 291 U.S. 138 (1934). See also
Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1 (1956).
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In construing any treaty between the United States and an Indian tribe, it must always . . . be borne in
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and powerful nation, by representatives skilled in diplomacy, masters of a written language,
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Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1899) (citing Worcester v. State of Georgia., 31 U.S. at 515).
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into consideration the Indians’ lack of literacy and lack of familiarity with the United
States legal system, and the limited understanding of the jargon in which negotiations
were conducted.106 Ambiguities extant in United States-Indian treaties, then, are to be
construed liberally in favor of the Indian tribes and in all cases, “the intention to abrogate
or modify a treaty is not to be lightly imputed to Congress.” 107 But what exactly does this
mean–when, if at all, can a state or the Federal government entirely abrogate a United
States-Indian treaty, or merely enact a statute that infringes upon a treaty-reserved right
such as the right to hunt and fish, or the right to whale?
D. The State Conservation Necessity Test
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution “ensures that [Federal]
laws regulating Indian affairs and treaties with tribes supersede conflicting state laws or
state constitutional provisions.”108 Yet the Supreme Court has also held that by virtue of
its police power, the state and its political subdivisions can regulate the off-reservation
exercise of treaty-reserved hunting and fishing rights; but a state can only do so if it first
demonstrates that the “specific regulation is reasonable and necessary for
conservation.” 109 Additionally, the regulating state must also show that the conservation
objective cannot be attained by restricting only citizens other than treaty Indians and the
regulation must not discriminate against treaty Indians and must meet appropriate due
process standards.110 This is the state conservation necessity test: states do have the
authority to qualify treaty-guaranteed rights, provided first that the regulation is
“necessary” for the “conservation” of the affected species and only if the goals of the
regulation cannot be attained by restricting only citizens other than treaty Indians, and in
no way may the regulation discriminate against treaty Indians.111
As early as 1942, the Supreme Court suggested the possibility of a state
regulating off-reservation Indian fishing and hunting activity, despite United StatesIndian treaties explicitly preserving these same rights. In Tulee v. Washington,112 a
Yakima Indian was arrested for catching salmon off reservation without a license, in
violation of Washington State law.113 The fishing right the Yakima had been exercising
was explicitly reserved in the 1854 Treaty of Medicine Creek: 114 the “right of taking fish,
106
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at all usual and accustomed grounds and stations, is further secured to said Indians in
common with all citizens of the Territory.”115 The Supreme Court held that the Treaty of
Medicine Creek did not permit the state from charging the Yakima a license “fee of the
kind in question here.”116 The Court found that the state’s
regulatory purpose could be accomplished otherwise, [and] that the
imposition of license fees is not indispensable to the effectiveness of a
state conservation program. Even though this method may be both
convenient and . . . fair, it acts upon the Indians as a charge for exercising
the very right their ancestors intended to reserve. We believe that such
exaction of fees as a prerequisite to the enjoyment of fishing in the "usual
and accustomed places" cannot be reconciled with a fair construction of
the treaty. We therefore hold the state statute invalid as applied in this
case.117
The Court’s choice of language, “[t]he license fees prescribed are regulatory as well as
revenue producing . . . [b]ut it is clear that their regulatory purpose could be
accomplished otherwise,” suggests two things: (1) it may be possible for a state to
regulate Indian treaty-reserved fishing rights, but (2) only if no other regulatory measure
(e.g. one that does not infringe upon a treaty-reserved right) can accomplish the
“regulatory purpose” at issue. In response to this ruling, the State of Washington ceased
charging the Yakima Indians a license fee. But on grounds that regulating offreservation exercise of treaty-reserved fishing rights was “indispensable”118 to the
state’s “regulatory purpose,”119 the State of Washington continued to regulate the act. 120
Indian resistance to the regulations increased until the State of Washington sued the
Puyallup and Nisqually Tribes and several of the Tribes’ members to enjoin further
fishing inconsistent with state law, even when the fishing was ostensibly reserved by
Treaty.121
The resulting lawsuit, Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game (“Puyallup I”),122
concerned a Washington State regulation effectively banning off-reservation net fishing
of steelhead trout and salmon by everyone, Indian and non-Indian alike. As stated, the
United States-Puyallup Treaty guaranteed the Puyallup the right to fish at their “usual
and accustomed grounds and stations . . . in common with all citizens of the Territory.”
The Supreme Court went on to hold for the first time in explicit terms that a state can
lawfully regulate treaty rights of Indian tribes, finding that the tribes’ use of the nets at
issue to capture salmon and steelhead trout was illegal under the Washington law.
http://www.historylink.org/index.cfm?DisplayPage=output.cfm&file_id=5254 (last visited Oct. 31, 2012).
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The treaty right is in terms of the right to fish “at all usual and accustomed
places.” We assume that fishing by nets was customary at the time of the
Treaty . . . [b]ut the manner in which the fishing may be done and its
purpose . . . are not mentioned in the Treaty. We would have quite a
different case if the Treaty had reserved the right to fish at the “usual and
accustomed places” in the “usual and accustomed” manner. But the
Treaty is silent as to the mode or modes of fishing that are guaranteed.
Moreover, the right to fish at those respective places is not an exclusive
one. Rather it is one “in common with all citizens of the Territory.”
Certainly the right of the latter may be regulated. And we see no reason
why the right of the Indians may not also be regulated by an appropriate
exercise of the police power of the State . . . [T]he manner of fishing, the
size of the take, the restriction of commercial fishing, and the like may be
regulated by the State in the interest of conservation, provided the
regulation meets appropriate standards and does not discriminate against
the Indians.123
In 1972, Federal Indian Law scholar Professor Ralph W. Johnson 124 accordingly
predicted a “continuing series of clashes between the Indians and the state, each
seeking to carve out the broadest possible claim in this legal thicket” 125 on grounds that
the newly-coined conservation necessity test was “notoriously vague.” 126 As it turns out,
his prediction was not entirely inaccurate.
On remand from the United States Supreme Court, the Washington Supreme
Court found that Puyallup I’s ban against net fishing was necessary for species
conservation and thus held lawful the State’s ban on all Indian net fishing.127 After hookand-line sport fishing, there were only sufficient numbers of steelhead left to propagate
the species. The tribe disputed this assertion and their claim became Puyallup II.128
The United States Supreme Court then went on with relative ease to conclude that the
ostensible state-granted priority for hook-and-line sport fishing, though facially neutral,
discriminated against the Indians because nearly all Indian fishing was carried out by
net, in the now prohibited fashion. “There is discrimination here because all Indian net
fishing is barred and only hook-and-line fishing, entirely preempted by non-Indians, is
123

Id. at 398 (quoting Treaty of Medicine Creek, art. 3, 10 Stat. at 1133). Yet because the question of the
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measure had not been addressed by the Washington State courts, the case was remanded and the lower
State courts were told that “any ultimate findings on the conservation issue must also cover the issue of
equal protection implicit in the phrase ‘in common with.’” Id. at 403.
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allowed.”129 Nevertheless, the Court reasoned, “the Treaty does not give the Indians a
federal right to pursue the last living steelhead until it enters their nets.” 130 The Court
thus propagated the principle that the non-discrimination aspect of the state
conservation necessity test guarantees treaty fishermen not just the opportunity to fish
on the same terms as other citizens, but a share of the harvestable fish.
Whereas Puyallup I and II dealt with Indians’ rights to treaty-reserved fishing offreservation, in 1977 the United States Supreme Court 131 confronted the issue of a
state’s ability to lawfully regulate Indians’ on-reservation exercise of their treatyreserved fishing rights. The United States Supreme Court held that indeed a state,
subject to the state conservation necessity test, could also regulate on-reservation
exercise, by Indians, of treaty-protected fishing rights.
Though it would be decidedly unwise, if Puyallup treaty fishermen were
allowed untrammeled on-reservation fishing rights, they could interdict
completely the migrating fish run and “pursue the last living steelhead until
it enters their nets.” In this manner the treaty fishermen could totally
frustrate both the jurisdiction of the Washington courts and the rights of
non-Indian citizens of Washington recognized in the Treaty of Medicine
Creek. In practical effect, therefore, the petitioner is reasserting the right to
exclusive control of the steelhead run that was unequivocally rejected in
both Puyallup I and Puyallup II. At this state of this protracted litigation, we
are unwilling to re-examine those unanimous decisions or to render their
holdings virtually meaningless.132
In theory, then, a state is able to lawfully regulate the exercise–on and off
reservation–of Indian treaty rights. Yet in practice, the United States Supreme Court
requires an exacting standard. In order to lawfully regulate the exercise of Indian treaty
rights, in each instance the state must demonstrate that (1) the regulation is necessary
for the conservation of the concerned species; (2) no other regulation is sufficient to
effect the intended species conservation than the regulation at issue; and (3) any
regulation meeting this necessity test must not have the practical effect, even though
the regulation may be facially neutral, of denying Indian fishermen the ability to fish.
Indeed, applying the canons of treaty interpretation to the in-common-with language of
United States-Indian treaties demands that the Indians possess a right to the harvest of
no less than one half of the harvestable total take of the species at issue. But what
about federal regulation of Indian treaty rights? Are the standards as exacting? In light
of Congress’ plenary power over Indian tribes, is the same conservation necessity test
appropriate?
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E. The Federal Weight and Consideration Test
The United States Supreme Court stated in 1903 that “Congress may abrogate
treaties and tribal sovereignty when circumstances arise which . . . not only justify the
government in disregarding the stipulations of [a] treaty, but may demand, in the
interests of the country and of the Indians themselves, that it should do so.” 133 In
considering the effect of congressional regulation on an Indian treaty right, the general
presumption militates against treaty abrogation. The United States Supreme Court
offered guidance for this general proposition in Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United
States.134 An 1854 treaty set aside territory for the Menominee and reserved hunting
and fishing rights on the reservation lands. 135 One hundred years later, Congress
passed the Menominee Termination Act136 to take effect in 1964 whereby
all statutes of the United States which affect Indians because of their
status as Indians shall no longer be applicable to the members of the tribe,
and the laws of the several States shall apply to the tribe and its members
in the same manner as they apply to other citizens or persons within their
jurisdiction.137
This effectively removed the United States-Menominee trust relationship and ceased to
recognize, at least legally, the Menominee as a bona fide Indian tribe. Yet the
Termination Act did not mention the Menominee’s treaty-reserved right of hunting and
fishing. The State of Wisconsin, seeking to charge the Menominee state hunting and
fishing license fees, argued that the Termination Act was a per se extinguishment of
their fishing and hunting rights. A majority of the Warren Court138 disagreed and
“decline[d] to construe the Termination Act as a backhanded way of abrogating the
hunting and fishing rights of these Indians, [finding] it difficult to believe that Congress
without explicit statement would subject the United States to a claim of compensation by
destroying property rights conferred by treaty.”139 Thus, treaty-reserved hunting and
fishing rights are not extinguished absent congressional intent to do so. But despite
Menominee’s requirement of clear cl intent to abrogate a treaty-reserved right, in United
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relationship had theretofore exempted them. See U.S. House of Representatives Resolution 108, 83rd
Congress, 1953.
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States v. Dion140 the United States Supreme Court rejected a per se rule requiring
explicit congressional language to do so, in favor of a federal weight and consideration
test.
Generally, Indians enjoy exclusive treaty rights to hunt and fish on lands reserved
to them, unless such rights were clearly relinquished by treaty or have been modified by
Congress.141 Determining just when these treaty rights become clearly relinquished was
the Court’s task in Dion. When the state of South Dakota convicted Mr. Dion, a Yankton
Sioux, for killing four bald eagles on reservation land in violation of the Eagle Protection
Act142 (EPA) and the ESA, Mr. Dion asserted as his defense his treaty-reserved right of
taking eagles for non-commercial purposes. The court found this argument of little avail
and held that the EPA and the ESA reflected an unmistakable and explicit legislative
policy choice that Indian hunting of the bald or golden eagle, except pursuant to a
permit, was inconsistent with the need to preserve those species and that both laws
abrogated the treaty right to unrestricted hunting.
[W]here the evidence of congressional intent to abrogate is sufficiently
compelling, the weight of authority indicates that such an intent can also
be found by a reviewing court from clear and reliable evidence in the
legislative history of a statute. What is essential is clear evidence that
Congress actually considered the conflict between its intended action on
the one hand and Indian treaty rights on the other, and chose to resolve
that conflict by abrogating the treaty. 143
In establishing the federal weight and consideration test, the Court noted that in
implementing the EPA,
Congress expressly chose to set in place a regime in which the Secretary
of the Interior had control over Indian hunting, rather than one in which
Indian on-reservation hunting was unrestricted. Congress thus considered
the special cultural and religious interests of Indians, balanced those
needs against the conservation purposes of the statute, and provided a
140

United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986).
FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 18 (2005 ed.). See generally Menominee Tribe v.
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specific, narrow exception that delineated the extent to which Indians
would be permitted to hunt the bald and golden eagle.144
After Dion, in order for a congressional statute to abrogate a treaty-reserved right,
Congress must only consider the regulated action weighed against the action reserved
in the treaty, and then choose to infringe upon the treaty-reserved right.
Further cementing the correctness of the federal weight and consideration test,
the United States Supreme Court has applied the Dion analysis to two subsequent
cases, South Dakota v. Bourland;145 and Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa
Indians.146 Bourland held that Congress abrogated the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe’s
treaty-reserved right to “absolute and undisturbed use and occupation” 147 of former
tribal trust lands when Congress acquired the trust lands for a dam and flood control
project. Congress explicitly reserved tribal rights to hunt and fish around the reservoir
“subject to the regulations governing the corresponding use by other citizens of the US”
148
and this limited reservation of rights could not be supported, except by presuming c
intent to abrogate the Tribe’s treaty-reserved right of hunting and fishing on and off
reservation lands. Holding conversely that treaty-reserved149 rights to hunt and fish were
not abrogated by a subsequent c act,150 the Court in Mille Lacs explicitly held there was
no “clear evidence” 151 that Congress intended to abrogate the treaty-reserved “privilege
of hunting, fishing and gathering.”152 In both cases, the federal weight and consideration
test, promulgated in Dion, was upheld and used to determine each case’s outcome.
Bourland and Mille Lacs were each decided after Puyallup I and II yet neither
Bourland nor Mille Lacs follows –or even mentions–the state conservation necessity
test. In neither Dion, Bourland, nor Mille Lacs did the Court say it was overruling any
decision which developed or supported the state conservation necessity test. Nor does
Dion cite any Supreme Court decision–nor any Ninth Circuit decision, in any relevantly
meaningful capacity153–that either supports or develops the state conservation
necessity test. This illustrates further the Court’s clear intention to promulgate two
distinct tests to determine the constitutionality of federal regulations which interfere with
144
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United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. at 739, does cite Washington v. Washington State Commercial
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treaty-reserved rights on the one hand, and state regulations which interfere with treatyreserved rights on the other: the weight and consideration test applicable to the former,
the conservation necessity test applicable to the latter.154
III. ANDERSON V. EVANS AND WHY IT VIOLATES FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
Anderson arose in the wake of the NMFS and the NOAA response to Metcalf.
Complying with that court’s directive, in January of 2001 NMFS and NOAA published
another Draft Environmental Assessment. The whale quota in this Draft, and in the
Makah Management Plan which accompanied it, targeted migrating whales. This meant
that whaling would be allowed only in the “open waters of the Pacific Ocean which are
outside the Tatoosh-Bonilla Line,”155 thus targeting migratory whales. But the Makah
revised their management plan; the amended plan, in contrast to the Tribe’s earlier
management plan, did “not contain any general geographic limitations on the whale
hunt.”156 This amendment was not incorporated into the Draft Environmental
Assessment and there had thus “been no opportunity for public comment on the
important”157 change. Additionally, none of the scientific studies relied upon in the Draft
EA evaluated the impact of the revised management plan.158 Nevertheless, the NOAA
and the NMFS issued a FONSI, thereby obviating the need to proceed, under NEPA,
with an EIS.159 The next “step in the administrative saga took place when NOAA and the
NMFS issued a Federal Register notice on December 13, 2001 announcing a quota”160
of five gray whales in 2001 and 2002, and in approval of the Makah management
plan.161
It should come as no surprise, then, that citizens and animal welfare groups filed
another complaint in January 2002, alleging violations of both the National
Environmental Policy Act and the Marine Mammal Protection Act. Once again, the
Makah Tribe intervened as a defendant, and once again, on the district court level,
summary judgment was granted to the defendants, whereupon the plaintiffs, once
again, appealed.162 The saga took its most relevant and unhappy turn when the Ninth
Circuit considered the plaintiffs’ appeal from the district court’s summary judgment, and
reversed the lower court. The court held in Anderson v. Evans that the government’s
failure to prepare an EIS violated NEPA and the MMPA’s take moratorium and
permitting process was binding upon the Tribe’s exercise of its treaty-reserved right to
hunt whales. On November 26, 2003163 and June 7, 2004,164 the Ninth Circuit Court of
154
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Appeals denied en banc rehearings and issued amended opinions which clarified the
(faulty) legal reasoning of its decision, but did not alter the conclusion.
Having held that the Marine Mammal Protection Act proscribes the Makah Tribe’s
treaty-reserved whaling rights, the Anderson Court stated that they were not overruling
the Treaty of Neah Bay’s explicitly-reserved right to whale; this however is in essence
the practical impact of the decision. In reaching its conclusion, the Court used the state
conservation necessity test which the United States Supreme Court in Puyallup I, II and
US v. Washington used to assess the constitutionality of state laws which infringe upon
Indian treaty rights, while the MMPA is a federal law. Regardless of the United States
Supreme Court’s clear intention to promulgate two distinct tests to assess a federal or a
state statute’s constitutionality when the statute infringes upon a treaty-reserved right, it
is this latter test, this state conservation necessity test, which the Ninth Circuit followed
in applying the MMPA in Anderson v. Evans.
The satisfaction of the state conservation necessity test was instrumental in the
Ninth Circuit’s ruling against a Tulalip Indian who shot and killed a bald eagle on the
Tulalip reservation in United States v. Fryberg.165 In Fryberg, the Ninth Circuit faced in
1980 the same issue the Supreme Court would address in 1986 in Dion: whether the
Eagle Protection Act modified or abrogated Indian treaty-reserved rights. In deciding the
matter, the Ninth Circuit took its cue from the Puyallup cases, applying the state
conservation necessity test, this time to a federal statute, which the United States
Supreme Court in Puyallup I and Puyallup II etched into judicial granite. Yet each
Puyallup case involved state conservation laws, not federal statutes. Further illustrative
of the fact that the United States Supreme Court in Dion was developing a distinct test
to be used for determining the relevance of federal statutes to treaty-reserved rights, is
the incontrovertible fact that not once–not in the text, not in a footnote–in its Dion
opinion did the United States Supreme Court six years later mention either Fryberg or
any of the Puyallup cases. Indeed, there was no need to mention either because neither
was relevant. Instead, there was to be a distinction between manner of determining the
relevance of a state’s conservation statute to treaty-reserved tribal rights and
determining the relevance of a federal statute to treaty-reserved tribal rights because
the provenance of state authority over Indian tribes differs from the provenance of
federal authority over Indian tribes.
The Ninth Circuit was careful to note in Anderson, however, that they were not
deciding whether or not the MMPA actually abrogated the Makah treaty-reserved right
to whale, holding only that satisfaction of the state conservation necessity test bound
the Makah to MMPA regulations.166 But hearkening to the distinction between regulation
and abrogation as a way to avoid the larger abrogation analysis is intellectual sophistry
which skirts the issue of whether Congress intended a federal statute to even apply to–
and in this way to limit–an Indian treaty-reserved right. Applying the state conservation
necessity test to determine the effects of a state statute violates a sacrosanct tenant in
165
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the field of Federal Indian Law and a Supreme Court admonition: congressional intent to
modify or abrogate Indian treaty-rights “is not to be lightly imputed.”167 Having used the
state conservation and necessity test to bind the Makah to the MMPA, the Ninth Circuit
has subjected the Makah’s treaty-reserved right to whale to the academics and the
“‘expert administrators’ whose power-drives” may very well “reflect the rise and fall in
our democratic faith.”168
IV. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE MAKAH’S EFFORTS
How, then, have the Makah responded? In Ms. Emily Brand’s words:
After two rejected en banc rehearing requests, the Tribe had to decide
whether to appeal Anderson to the United States Supreme Court or follow
the Ninth Circuit's direction. The Makah chose to forgo appeal and follow
Anderson. The possibility of the Supreme Court affirming the decision and
creating groundbreaking precedent against treaty rights for all tribes was
too big of a risk.169
And so in September of 2003, having worked closely with federal agencies “on marine
mammal issues for over fifteen years, the Makah Tribe formally instituted a Marine
Mammal Management Program” of its own. 170 The Tribe intended to monitor marine
mammal populations, particularly the Eastern North Pacific stock of gray whales, within
its usual and accustomed whaling areas171 and to develop regulations “regarding
marine mammals that might be stranded in Makah territory or be caught as incidental
bycatch in the Tribe’s fisheries.”172 Paramount among the program’s motives was to
“reduce incidental mortality of marine mammals . . . and look at ways to reduce harm to
gear.”173 The program scheduled and oversaw “marksmanship training” 174 for hopeful
whaling crews and for the next three years would participate in survey operations,
charged with identifying gray whales by visual observations and aerial photographs. 175
In 2004, the Makah Program began to participate in the IWC Scientific Committee
meetings–sending its marine biologist to participate in the meetings as a United States
delegate–and this collaboration “continued in 2005 and 2006.” 176 In 2004, the Makah
marine biologist was invited to join a “research project that documented and monitored
contaminants in marine mammals collected” in the Makah’s usual and accustomed
whaling grounds.177 Having become of its own accord entirely satisfied that resuming its
167
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treaty-reserved whaling practice yet again would pose absolutely no deleterious effects
on the global California Gray Whale population, on February 14, 2005, the Makah sent
NOAA Fisheries a request for a limited waiver of the MMPA take moratorium, including
the issuance of regulations and any necessary permits. The application submitted
explicitly explained the Makah’s request, the applicable law, the international California
Gray Whale populations, and the impact Makah whaling may have on the California
Gray Whale population.178 In response, NOAA published a notice of availability of the
waiver request on March 3, 2005179 and the process began anew for the third time. On
August 25, 2005, NOAA Fisheries published a Notice of Intent to conduct public scoping
meetings and to prepare the EIS required under NEPA, the MMPA and Anderson,
related to the Makah Tribe’s request to resume its treaty-reserved practice of whaling.180
Initially, NOAA proposed that its updated draft EIS would be ready for public comment
in December of 2006 and that the final draft EIS would be complete “in August or
September” 181 of 2007; the comment period would then begin and a final document,
and a final decision, would “follow eight to ten months later, in the summer of 2008.” 182
But not until nearly three years later, on May 9, 2008, did NOAA Fisheries announce the
release of a draft EIS, and the comment period began.183 And even now, more than four
years after the comment period began, NOAA has still failed to make a final
determination.
Of particular importance to NOAA’s consideration of the Tribe's request is
information on the genetic structure of the Eastern Northern Pacific Stock of Gray
Whales. Three “Technical Memorandums” 184 currently under consideration implicitly
argue that the 2008 Draft EIS is insufficient for failing to address the possibility that the
178
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Eastern North Pacific stock185 of the California Gray Whale is sufficiently isolated from
the rest of the global population to merit a new Draft EIS. The majority of California Gray
whales migrate north to “summer feeding grounds in the Bering, Chukchi, and Beaufort
Seas [while] a small number of individuals [of about 200] spend the summer feeding in
the waters ranging from northern California to southeast Alaska.” 186 The
scientific/academic community commonly regards the former constituency as the
northern feeding group and the latter as the southern feeding group. A California Gray
whale learns from its mother “site fidelity to different feeding grounds.”187 Because
California Gray whale calves have through the ages learned from their mothers what
and where a feeding ground is, one memorandum contends that “knowledge of specific
feeding areas is only present within certain matrilines. Therefore, if whales are
extirpated from a specific feeding ground, they will not be ‘replaced’ (or the area will not
be repopulated) by others.”188 The memorandum also demonstrates that there are very
slight mitochondrial differences extant between the northern and southern feeding
groups and argues that these differences predate whaling. 189 Accordingly, because with
the extirpation of the 200 whales which the authors presume comprise the southern
feeding group, the strain of whales possessing that slight mitochondrial distinction will
not re-populate. The authors themselves concede that there is some degree of
migration between the northern and southern feeding groups, but assert that “although
reliable estimates of migration rates could not be obtained here, the data clearly show
that rate of migration is low enough for the two groups to represent independent
demographic entities.”190 The authors then conclude that the southern feeding group
consequently “qualifies as a separate management unit, and requires separate
management considerations.”191 While the Memorandum does not state exactly what
these considerations should compel, all they can compel is another EIS.
Taking the authors’ contentions to be true, the authors still fail to address the
near extirpation of the species and the geographic size of the southern feeding group’s
southern feeding grounds. Consider the following: if the southern feeding group is a
distinct “management unit,” as the authors contend, and if once extirpated cannot
repopulate, then the near extinction of the entire global population of California Gray
Whales failed to eliminate that small southern feeding group. But somehow the Makah’s
hunting of four whales per year–not necessarily killing four whales per year–when the
northern feeding group is also passing through the Makah’s usual and accustomed
whaling areas bound for their winter feeding grounds is a sufficiently grave threat to the
population of a presumed amount of 200 whales, is enough to merit an entirely new
Draft EIS. Further, by the author’s own admission, the southern feeding grounds of the
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southern feeding group extends from “northern California to southeast Alaska.” 192 But
the Makah’s usual and accustomed whaling areas is an area that does not extend south
of the Olympic Peninsula.193
Still more maddening is that to combat this kind of scientific speculation and
murkiness, courts past have fashioned the Canons of Treaty Construction and
developed from them the federal weight and consideration test. The recent “Technical
Memorandums,” are stultifying the current NOAA process. The potential result of yet
another Draft EIS demonstrates just a handful of consequences attending three judges’
decision to bind the Makah’s treaty-reserved right to whale to the rubric of the
conservation necessity test, in defiance of Supreme Court precedent.
But the Ninth Circuit for its part seems to have corrected itself and embarked
upon a path destined to either proscribe the applicability of Anderson’s use of the
conservation necessity test only to assessing the relationship between “state
regulations and treaties with ‘in common’ rights,’”194 or ridding itself altogether of the
Makah’s tragic, crushing millstone. Addressing a pre-trial motion195 in a case involving
whether or not the Migratory Bird Treaty Act abrogated hunting rights reserved by the
Yakama Treaty, on August 13, 2009, federal judge Edward F. Shea of the Eastern
District of Washington addressed squarely the Anderson court’s errors. “[A] court
analyzing the impact of federal legislation on treaty rights must determine whether
Congress clearly and plainly intended to modify or abrogate an Indian treaty right.” 196
Judge Shea then addressed the series of cases – Puyallup I and II and Fryberg – which
develop and chart the application of the conservation necessity test to state statutes
that would infringe upon Indian treaty-reserved rights. Judge Shea then described the
weight and consideration test implemented by Dion, noting that “while Congress has the
authority to abrogate an Indian treaty right, a state does not.” 197 Although “the Ninth
Circuit [in Anderson] was analyzing a federal [statute], not a state statute or regulation,
the Ninth Circuit failed to use congressional treaty abrogation analysis. This failure
conflicts with . . . basic principles of Indian treaty analysis.”198 Judge Shea noted that the
Anderson court, despite its intellectual prestidigitations, did recognize that Dion did not
discuss the conservation necessity test but the Anderson court erroneously concluded
“that the conservation necessity test . . . has not been undermined by later cases and is
supported by the Supreme Court authorities.”199 This “conclusion,” Judge Shea
asserted, “was reached without analysis and is wrong. The Supreme Court cases
alluded to [in Anderson] involved state regulations and treaties with ‘in common’ rights.
When the Supreme Court has explicitly used congressional treaty abrogation analysis to
192
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interpret federal statutes, the same analysis should be used when interpreting the same
federal statutes and treaty rights.”200
Judge Shea is not alone in this belief. Writing for the District Court from the
District of Nevada and similarly called upon to address the extent to which the Migratory
Bird Treaty Act may have abrogated Indian treaty-reserved rights, Magistrate Judge
Lawrence R. Leavitt similarly criticized the Anderson fiat.201 “In assessing whether
Congress implicitly abrogated a treaty right, what is essential, is clear and convincing
evidence that Congress considered the conflict between its intended action on the one
hand and Indian treaty rights on the other. [After undergoing this analysis, if Congress
subsequently] chose to resolve the conflict by abrogating the treaty . . . the proper
approach,” continued Magistrate Leavitt, “would be clear but for the Ninth Circuit’s 1980
decision in United States v. Fryberg and the application of Fryberg’s analysis [– the
conservation necessity test –] in Anderson v. Evans.”202 Magistrate Leavitt then went on
to repeat that in developing its conservation necessity test, the Ninth Circuit based its
“doctrine on various Supreme Court cases, all of which involve state conservation
statutes or regulations, and not congressional treaty abrogation power.”203 In
recognizing that the Dion Court used the weight and consideration test to determine the
applicability of a congressional enactment to a treaty-reserved right, Magistrate Leavitt
was similarly careful to note that in Dion the Supreme Court “employed an abrogation
analysis in reaching its holding, without once referring to Fryberg or the state-based
conservation necessity analysis [from the Ninth Circuit]. Nevertheless, eight years after
Dion, the Ninth Circuit in Anderson v. Evans applied the conservation necessity doctrine
to a federal statute without recognizing or engaging in an abrogation analysis.” 204 As
categorically as Judge Shea had, Magistrate Leavitt then concluded that the “Ninth
Circuit’s decision in Anderson cannot be reconciled with the Supreme Court’s decision
in Dion.”205 The Anderson Court’s conclusion that its own conservation necessity test
ought to be applied in determining the applicability of congressional enactments to
Indian treaty-reserved rights “was reached without analysis.”206
The Anderson court clearly conflated the state conservation necessity test with
the federal weight and consideration test in holding the Makah’s exercise of their treatyreserved right to whale bound by the MMPA. But the great tragic irony of the matter is
that in defense of four whales per year of the estimated 20,000 global beasts, three
circuit judges have embarked upon a course which further erodes tribal sovereignty and
cultural identity when the absence of whaling presents devastating consequences on
Makah health and their collective psyche.207 Particularly illustrative of the ridiculousness
200
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of this fact and the decided, intuitive injustice of it all is the quota of 120 whales per year
granted by the IWC–the recognized global expert administrative body on the California
Gray Whale–to the Russian Confederation on behalf of the Chukotka while three circuit
judges sitting on a domestic American court have prohibited the Makah from hunting
four whales per year in exercise of its treaty-reserved right to do so. Compounding the
maddening injustice is that in doing this, these circuit judges have chosen to ignore
United States Supreme Court precedent in favor of applying the test the Ninth Circuit
itself developed, even when the United States Supreme Court has held that the Ninth
Circuit’s test is to be applied in determining the effect state statutes–not federal
statutes–have on Indian treaty-reserved rights. As Indian Law scholar Felix S. Cohen
presciently penned 60 years ago, stifling the exercise of much of what it means to be
Makah “reflects the rise and fall in our democratic faith”208 as the Ninth Circuit brings the
Makah under the heel of “expert administrators whose power-drives are always
accompanied by soft music about the withering away of the state or the ultimate
liquidation of this or that bureau.”209
Whereas once the Makah were warriors, mastering the storms and calms and
collecting for their kin the giants of the deep, now the Makah have only their bit of earth,
the rain, and a whisper, a hope and a dream of re-establishing that practice once
abandoned out of respect for the leviathan itself–this as the Ninth Circuit chooses to
apply the wrong rubric in order to protect 20 California Gray whales over the course of
five years, even as the Makah’s northern neighbors are free to take 120 California Gray
Whales in a single 365-day period. The decided, pernicious danger of the Ninth Circuit’s
application of its conjured legal precedent in order to subject the Makah to the
administrative leviathan is that in choosing to protect four living leviathans per year,
even more of what yet remains of tribal sovereignty and cultural distinction is taken from
the Makah. While the effects of this loss of cultural identity continue in earnest to affect
the Makah, the reason for its taking is entirely illusory.

one in five male high school students is currently using drugs and or alcohol. . . . 71.0 % of the [recent
survey’s] respondents view the whale hunt as a means to maintain a healthy lifestyle for youth, as well as
increase pride in being a Makah. In addition, [Makah Whaling Commission] members share the opinion
that the ceremonies which must occur before a hunt, and the clean/sober lifestyle that hunters and their
families must have, are a critical part of the Makah Tribe’s spiritual profile. The moratorium on active
hunting places Makah families at risk because important ceremonial practices cannot take place. These
ceremonies have evolved over millennia, and shall not take place unless hunters are preparing for an
actual hunt. Without an active hunt, [Makah Whaling Commission] members fear that an important part of
the ceremonial life that was restored during the active hunting period in the late 1990s will remain in
jeopardy . . . it is hard for Makah people to live under the stress of a concerted effort to derail a religious
activity and an important aspect of tribal identity whose end product also provides a subsistence
benefit.”).
208
Felix S. Cohen, The Erosion of Indian Rights, 1950–1953: A Case Study in Bureaucracy, 62 YALE L.J.
348, 390 (1953).
209
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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